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COMMENTS
A STATUTORY PROPOSAL TO DETERMINE
ARBITRAL FORUMS FOR 10(b) DISPUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 1987, the United States Supreme Court handed
down McMahon v. Shearson lAmerican Express, Inc.' McMahon
overruled thirty-four years of judicial precedent' by enforcing an ar-
bitration provision found in a securities brokerage contract.' This
comment ventures beyond the holding of McMahon, addressing the
validity of pre-dispute venue provisions imbedded within brokerage
arbitration contracts.'
© 1988 by Ward M. Merdes
1. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
2. Prior to McMahon v. Shearson American Express, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987), the valid-
ity of pre-dispute arbitration agreements between securities brokers and clients was governed
by the seminal case of Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). Wilko was widely hailed as
barring arbitration of section 10(b) violations though its facts deal with section 12(2) of the
1933 Securities Act, rather than 12(2)'s counterpart, section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act.
The 1985 decision of Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), cast
doubt upon the "Wilko doctrine" and, in 1987, McMahon held "agreements to arbitrate Ex-
change Act claims 'enforce[able] ...in accord with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration
Act.' " 107 S. Ct. at 2343 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974)).
Consequently, McMahon makes it clear that brokers may rely upon pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. However, a serious question arises as to how these agreements will be structured
and interpreted by the courts.
3. A "brokerage contract" is defined as:
A contract of agency, whereby broker is employed to make contracts of kind
agreed upon in name and on behalf of his principal, and for which he is paid an
agreed commission. A unilateral contract wherein the principal makes an offer
which is interpreted as promise to pay broker a commission in consideration of
his producing a buyer ready, able, and willing to buy the property on the prin-
cipal's terms.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (5th ed. 1979).
4. Most brokerage disputes focus upon section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-78(kk) (1982) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
This comment deals exclusively with 10(b) disputes. Section 10(b) provides:
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At first blush, McMahon can be read as simply another step
toward the judiciary's unqualified acceptance of arbitration as an al-
ternative to adjudication. However, the ultimate impact of McMahon
may be to inadvertently strike a crippling blow to Congress' and the
United States Supreme Court's protectionist attitude toward plain-
tiffs who bring suit under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act. Such an impact is possible not because of language in-
cluded within the McMahon decision, but rather because of
language that is excluded.
Limitations upon McMahon's impact stem from the fact that it
presented the Court with but two issues: (1) whether 10(b) disputes
are arbitrable; and (2) whether Rackateer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) violations are arbitrable. Therefore, the
impetus for granting certiorari to McMahon may have been to ad-
dress the RICO issue and not because of the Court's interest in rede-
fining the rights of 10(b) claimants.5  Consequently, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion is tailored to address RICO issues and
begs more questions than it answers with regard to the rights of sec-
tion 10(b) claimants. One of the questions McMahon's deficiencies
pose is how to deal with pre-dispute venue agreements in the arbi-
tral context.
This comment furnishes a brief description of: (1) the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925; (2) the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and (3) the legal basis for venue provisions.6 Case analysis is limited
to McMahon, which allowed arbitration of 10(b) disputes, and The
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
5. Justice O'Connor framed the Court's issues as follows:
Whether a claim brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
[cite omitted] must be sent to arbitration in accordance with the terms of an
arbitration agreement. The second [issue] is whether a claim brought under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) [cite omitted]
must be arbitrated in accordance with the terms of such an agreement.
107 S. Ct. at 2335.
6. This comment does not purport to fully address the issue of whether brokerage arbi-
tration contracts - or any clause imbedded therein - are adhesionary- The issue is raised
only to bulwark the author's contention that venue provisions toe the fine line of public interest
and warrant statutory enactment. See infra note 136.
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Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,' which reversed decades of judicial
distrust of pre-dispute venue provisions. Addressed next are the dual
issues of whether pre-arbitration venue agreements violate the 1934
Exchange Act's anti-waiver provision, thus being rendered void as
against public policy, and whether an amendment to the Federal Ar-
bitration Act or the securities acts would effectively preserve Con-
gress' intent to protect investors.
It is concluded that McMahon fails to go beyond the traditional
analysis espoused by its predecessor, Wilko v. Swan8 and provide
meaningful guidance to 10(b) claimants. The McMahon opinion
does little more than acknowledge each element of Wilko's analysis
and espouse an opposite conclusion. Consequently, McMahon gives
brokers the opportunity to take advantage of investors because it fails
to address the key issue of venue.
The following background section traces the development of
each area of law which is applicable to this comment. These areas
include The Federal Arbitration Act, the federal securities acts, and
common law and statutory venue.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Arbitration has been called "the oldest known method of settle-
ment of disputes between men." 9 King Solomon's use of arbitration
is discussed extensively in the Old Testament,"0 and mythology
abounds with decisions wrought from its colorful past." Even the
Romans recognized and enforced arbitration agreements.12 However,
for hundreds of years prior to enactment of the Federal Arbitration
Act, British and American courts were hostile to the concept. 3 Com-
mon law hostility was initially based upon both jealousy due to loss
of judicial power 14 and the fact that the English judiciary was fre-
7. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
8. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
9. See Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and Law, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 155
(1970); F. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVE-
MENTS (1948) (providing a historical overview of arbitration); Sayre, Development of Commer-
cial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1927).
10. See, e.g., 1 Kings 3:16-28.
11. See Emerson, supra note 9, at 156.
12. 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 360 (1959).
13. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir.
1942); see also H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924) (explaining needs of the
judiciary).
14. Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983-84.
1988]
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quently paid in proportion to its caseload. 5
Overbearing caseloads"6 and pressure from the business commu-
nity17 were the primary reasons why judicial hostility toward arbi-
tration waned in America. Congress eventually recognized that this
pressure had to be relieved. That realization, along with the prag-
matic advantages of arbitration," resulted in congressional action. In
1925, Congress exercised its power under the commerce clause 9 and
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act." Since 1925, all arbitral dis-
putes involving or affecting interstate and foreign commerce have
been governed by the Act."'
The Federal Arbitration Act has three major objectives. First, it
binds the judiciary's hands by removing its power to refuse to submit
disputes to arbitration. 2 Second, arbitration agreements are placed
15. Id. at 983 n.14.
16. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924); see also S. REP. No. 536, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
17. Note, Effect of the United States Arbitration Act, 25 GEo. L.J. 443, 445 n.20
(1937) (citing business demand as probable rationale for the Act).
18. Traditionally recognized advantages of arbitration include: (1) a drastic reduction in
time from complaint to resolution; (2) the ability of the parties to select their own mediator(s);
and (3) significant savings in cost over court proceedings. See generally M. DOMKE, COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION §§ 1.01-03, 16.01-03, 25.01-06 (1968).
19. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
20. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
21. The Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. (emphasis added).
The fact that the Act's source of power is the supremacy clause removes any doubt that
the Act controls over state law, regardless of what is stated in the text of the state code. Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404-05 (2d Cir. 1959); see also West
Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Multi-Line Industries, Inc., 231 Ga. 329, 331, 201 S.E.2d 452, 453
(1973) (wherein it was held that "the state law and policy with respect thereto [arbitration]
must yield to the paramount federal law .... ").
22. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982), provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial
of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceed-
ing with such arbitration.
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on equal footing with other contracts.23 Third, any party to an arbi-
tration agreement has the right to approach the judiciary to compel
its enforcement.2" Broadly stated, the Act provides that any contro-
versy capable of settlement by ordinary court proceedings may be
arbitrated.25
The net effect of the Act is to impose upon the judiciary a duty
to encourage arbitration.26 Any ambiguity27 or doubt28 regarding the
scope of arbitration is to be resolved in favor of applying the Act.29
In Prima Paint Corp v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,30 a
case involving a commercial contract with an arbitration provision,
the United States Supreme Court articulated Congress' intent behind
the Act as follows:
We hold, therefore, that . . . a federal court may consider only
issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement
to arbitrate. In so concluding, we not only honor the plain
meaning of the statute but also the unmistakably clear congres-
sional purpose that the arbitration procedure . . . be speedy
and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts."'
Consequently, courts give strong deference to congressional in-
tent behind the Act. They recognize that the sixty-eighth Congress
carefully drafted the arbitration laws, creating a remedy to govern
virtually any arbitral controversy. 2 Due to the extraordinarily broad
23. See supra note 21 (providing that the possibility of revoking an arbitration contract
is "as exists at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract").
24. The Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982), provides in pertinent part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such an agreement, would have jurisdiction
under Title 28 . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement.
Id.
25. DOMKE, supra note 18, § 12.02; see Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Con-
str. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
26. Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 984-85.
27. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-
83 (1960).
28. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
29. Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 410; see also H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1924) (supporting arbitration generally and advocating a liberal use of it as an alter-
native dispute resolution tool).
30. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
31. Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
32. The Federal Arbitration Act contains the following 14 separate sections:
1. "Maritime transactions" and "Commerce" defined; exception to operation
of title.
2. Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.
19881
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language in the Act, the only issues federal courts need determine
are: (1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists (a contract is-
sue);88 and (2) whether the dispute to be arbitrated are within the
purview of the broad congressional intent."'
The judiciary's commitment to carrying out congressional intent
behind the Federal Arbitration Act has been solidified by a trilogy of
cases which espouse a "presumption of arbitrability."35 A "presump-
tion of arbitrability" is simply a catch-all phrase designed to embrace
the plethora of claims the judiciary considers arbitral. This breadth
includes finding arbitration applicable in almost every situation, ex-
cept claims arising under section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act. 6
3. Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration.
4. Failure to arbitrate under agreement; petition to United States court having
jurisdiction for order to compel arbitration; notice and service thereof; hearing
and determination.
5. Appointment of arbitrators or umpire.
6. Application heard as motion.
7. Witnesses before arbitrators; fees; compelling attendance.
8. Proceedings begun by libel in admiralty and seizure of vessel or property.
9. Award of arbitrators; confirmation; jurisdiction; procedure.
10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing.
11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order.
12. Notice of motions to vacate or modify; service; stay of proceedings.
13. Papers filed with order on motions; judgment; docketing; force and effect;
enforcement.
14. Contracts not affected.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
33. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
34. This query is virtually always answered affirmatively. See National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 501 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1974) (Courts are limited to
determining whether a claim is governed by the arbitration agreement); McAlister Bros. Inc. v.
A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1980) (mandating that courts make a "thresh-
old inquiry" into whether the arbitration agreement covers the dispute.).
35. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car. Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
36. Section 12(2) states:
Any person who -
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of
section 77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said sec-
tion), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communica-
tion in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser
not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden
of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchas-
ing such security from him. . ..
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The foundation of this exception is the Wilko decision, which under-
takes to balance the congressional intent behind the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act and the Securities Acts. Therefore, to fully understand the
potential impact of McMahon, one must also understand the policy
considerations that motivated passage of both Federal Securities Acts.
B. The Federal Securities Acts
In response to the stock market crash of 1929, Congress enacted
the Securities Act of 1933 1 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.8 Congressional rationale for creating these acts was twofold.
First and most importantly, Congress attempted to set the nation's
economy on the road to recovery. 9 Second, Congress sought to pro-
tect investors from fraudulent practices in the sale and trade of se-
curities."' These purposes are evinced by the 1933 act's preamble
which states its purpose as follows: "To provide full and fair disclo-
sure of the character of securities sold in interstate and - foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale
thereof .. "41 Furthermore, "[t]he 1933 Act is intended to ensure
that purchasers have complete information about publicly offered
stocks and to protect the public from incomplete and misleading sales
talk about a stock to be offered." '42
To obtain these objectives, the 1933 act requires securities deal-
ers and underwriters to disclose all "material" facts when dealing
with investors.43 Such extensive disclosure is considered crucial for
37. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982). This comment ad-
dresses only section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
38. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (Supp. III 1985).
39. 77 CONG. REC. 2925 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Kelly); Id. at 3232 (remarks of Sen.
Norbeck); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). See SEC v. Capital Gains Bu-
reau, 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963) (stating that congressional rationale was "to achieve a high
standard of business ethics . . . in every facet of the securities industry."); see also United
States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1977).
40.- Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); Oklahoma-Texas Trust v.Securities and Exch. Comm., 100 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1939). In addition to protection ofinvestors, Congress clearly intended to protect ethical businessmen. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982).
42. L. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 9-50 (1983) (emphasis added).
43. A "dealer" is defined as one who "produces or buys or otherwise acquires something
in order to sell it." S. GIFis, LAw DICTIONARY 116 (2d ed. 1984) An "underwriter" is one
who underwrites, which is "to insure the satisfaction of an obligation." To underwrite a stock
or bond issue is to "insure the sale of stocks or bonds by agreeing to buy, before a certain date,
the entire issue if they are not sold to the public, or any part of the issue remaining after the
sale." Id. at 496-97.
The bounds of disclosure are codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-9(a) (1986), which states:
1988]
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fair dealings between underwriter-dealers and investors. This senti-
ment is pronounced because Congress interpreted such negotiations
as not possessing the crucial element of arm's length bargaining.""
Thus, it is clear that the 1933 act was designed to prevent fraud."
Congress again espoused the theme of fraud prevention and
consumer protection one year later when it enacted the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. "The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was
intended to remedy the many abuses in connection with the trading
markets which were described during the hearings which led to the
securities laws. Among these abuses were massive trading by corpo-
rate insiders and the issuance of false press releases.""'
Congress passed the 1934 Act to protect investors, the general
public and lending institutions that accept securities as collateral for
loans.47 It extends federal regulation to securities transactions han-
dled on all exchanges, over the counter markets and private transac-
tions.4 The 1934 Act is also intended to encourage adherence to fi-
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or
oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circum-
stances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any mate-
rial fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any state-
ment in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for
the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
Id.
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., sets forth the test for "materiality" under rule
14a-9 as: "An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." 426 U.S 438, 449 (1976)
(emphasis added). However, in Lyman v. Standard Brands, Inc., the court noted: "It is al-
ways extremely difficult for a court to determine with precision what effect a misstatement or
omission might have on a reasonable shareholder in the process of deciding how to vote." 364
F. Supp. 794, 797 (E.D. Pa. 1973)..
44. See S. REP. No. 37, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (noting that complete disclosure is
necessary to ensure the absence of "crooked promotion" and to "bring into productive channels
of industry ...capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding. ... ). The same
argument serves as a foundation to this comment. One of this comment's contentions is that
broker/investor agreements, which contain arbitration provisions, are typically negotiated at
less than arm's length. See infra note 136.
45. Congress further discouraged fraud by impressing strict anti-waiver provisions into
both acts. Section 14 of the 1933 Act provides that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n
(1982) (emphasis added).
46. RIBSTEIN, supra note 42, at 10-1.
47. Berko v. Securities & Exch. Comm., 316 F.2d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1963) (citing Se-
curities Exchange Comm. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953)).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982); see Carpenter v. Hall, 352 F. Supp. 806, 809 (S.D. Tex.
1972) (making the distinction that the 1933 Act relates to the distribution processes and the
[Vol. 28
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duciary duties inherent in securities trading."9 Furthermore, it is
strong evidence of Congress' attempts to discourage fraud50 and mar-
ket manipulation, 1 to control the amount of credit used in the secur-
ities market, and to protect national credit.5"
On its face, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act is singularly un-
spectacular, comprising only one short paragraph.5" However, the
section significantly furthers consumer welfare by establishing disclo-
sure requirements for all stock transfers. It is important to consider,
therefore, that 10(b) embraces the transfer of all securities from
General Motors stock, for example, traded over the New York Stock
Exchange to exchanges of family stock between brothers and sisters.
Since 10(b) addresses transactions involving millions of stock market
investors, it is a topic which inevitably breeds misunderstandings.
Consequently, 10(b) has been thoroughly litigated. Much of this liti-
gation has centered upon express or implied waivers of 10(b)'s
safeguards.
The anti-waiver provision of the 1934 Act"4 (section 29(a)) is
virtually identical to its counterpart in the 1933 Act 5 (section 14).
Section 29(a) of the 1934 Act provides that "[a]ny condition, stipula-
tion or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or
of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."" There-
1934 Act relates to post-distribution trading).
49. Rogers v. Crown Stove Works, 236 F. Supp. 572, 574 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Peoples Sec.
Co. v. S.E.C., 289 F.2d 268, 270 n.4 (5th Cir. 1961) (wherein the court states the Exchange
Act's fiduciary aspects are based upon a motivation "to protect honest enterprise, seeking capi-
tal by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to
the public through crooked promotion. (quoting S. REP. No. 37, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1933)).
50. McMillan v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 399 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
("Since the complaint in the present case charges fraud on the part of Defendants, it alleges
precisely the kind of conduct the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 sought to prevent."). See
generally Wells v. Blythe & Co., 351 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 430 (N.D. Cal. 1968) ("The Security Acts ... are essen-
tially directed at fraud.").
51. 1 L. Loss, SECURsTms REGULATION 883-84 (2d ed. 1961); see also Matter of Hal-
sey Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106, 112 (1949).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 7 8g(a) (1982).
53. For the full text of section 10(b), see supra note 4.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc. See infra text accompanying note 130.
55. For the full text of section 14 (the anti-waiver provisions of the 1933 Securities Act),
see supra note 45.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982). Section 78cc(b) of the same act also provides guidance
for contract provisions that exist in violation of the chapter. It states that:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule
or regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any contract for listing a
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fore, to invoke section 29(a)'s protection, the plaintiff must: (1) iden-
tify a "condition, stipulation or provision;" and (2) determine that
the same amounts to a waiver of statutory rights and remedies af-
forded securities purchasers under both securities acts.
An attempt, by agreement, to annul an express provision of ei-
ther securities act clearly amounts to a "waiver." '' A more difficult
characterization arises when an arbitration agreement merely re-
stricts a right granted by the Acts. Due to of subtleties that distin-
guish "waivers" from mere "restrictions" it is important to keep in
mind Congress' protectionist motivation behind the securities'acts
when considering whether an agreement constitutes a "waiver." An
example of how the Court has distinguished between restrictions and
waivers is McMahon.
1. McMahon v. Shearson /American Express, Inc.
The facts of McMahon are comparable to those of Wilko. In
1980-82, Eugen and Julia McMahon had various dealings with
Shearson/American Express, Inc. (Shearson). During the course of
these dealings, two "customer agreements" were signed. These
agreements provided for the arbitration of any controversy relating to
security on an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of
which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or prac-
tice in violation of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation there-
under, shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of
any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the per-
formance of any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who,
not being a party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder
with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or perform-
ance of such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation:
Provided, (A) That no contract shall be void by reason of this subsection be-
cause of any violation of any rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to para-
graph (2) or (3) of subsection (c) of section 78o of this title, and (B) that no
contract shall be deemed to be void by reason of this subsection in any action
maintained in reliance upon this subsection, by any person to or for whom any
broker or dealer sells, or from or for whom any broker or dealer purchases, a
security in violation of any rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to paragraph
(1) of subsection (c) of section 78o of this title, unless such action is brought
within one year after the discovery that such sale or purchase involves such
violation and within three years after such violation.
Id. (emphasis in original).
57. This comment takes the position that McMahon has created the potential for incred-
ible abuse by securities brokers. These abuses will surface in the form of specific provisions
imbedded within fine-print arbitration agreements. Potential areas of abuse include: (1) venue;
(2) selection of arbitrators; and (3) the availability of punitive damages to name a few. One of
this comment's contentions is that such provisions amount to a "waiver" within the meaning of
the Act and are thus void.
[Vol. 28
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the McMahon's accounts." Subsequently, in October of 1984, the
McMahons filed a complaint against a representative of Shearson
alleging violations of 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The
McMahons alleged that the representative, with Shearson's knowl-
edge, "engag[ed] in fraudulent, excessive trading on (the McMa-
hon's) accounts" and made "false statements and omitt[ed] material
facts from the advice given to [the McMahons]."" The complaint
also alleged a RICO violation. 0
The district court held the arbitration agreement binding with
regard to the 10(b) violation, 1 but not binding upon the RICO
claims "because of the important federal policies inherent in the en-
forcement of RICO by the federal courts."'1 2 The second circuit af-
firmed the district court with regard to the RICO claims, but re-
versed with regard to the 10(b) controversy. The circuit court held
that the "district court's decision that appellants' claims under §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are arbitrable is an unwarranted departure
from the settled law of this Circuit and must be reversed."6
The United States Supreme Court granted McMahon certio-
rari, "to resolve the conflict among the courts of appeals regarding
the arbitrability of § 10(b) and RICO claims."" Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion addressed each of McMahon's three arguments
against arbitration: (1) that Congress intended to preclude a waiver
of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue;65 (2) the arbitra-
tion agreement effects an impermissible waiver of 10(b)'s jurisdic-
tional provisions;" and (3) that arbitration weakens a plaintiff's
ability to recover under the Securities Exchange Act.6
The Court held, in order for the McMahon's to succeed in their
58. The arbitration provision within the McMahons's customer agreement provided:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of
or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement
or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
rules, then in effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or
the Boards of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., and/or the
American Stock Exchange, Inc. as I may elect.
McMahon, 618 F. Supp. 384, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (emphasis in original).
59. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2336.
60. Id.
61. The district court's decision was premised upon Justice White's concurrence in
Byrd, 470 U.S at 224.
62. McMahon, 618 F. Supp. at 387.
63. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 96.
64. 107 S. Ct. at 2336-37.
65. Id. at 2338.
66. Id. at 2339. This assertion was premised upon section 29(a) of the Exchange Act.
67. Id. at 2440.
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first argument, they must show such congressional intent as "will be
deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative history. . . ."" The
McMahons attempted to parallel Wilko's rationale by arguing that
such congressional intent "can be deduced from § 29(a) of the Ex-
change Act" which declares void "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provi-
sion of [the act]." '69 The McMahon's syllogism was further premised
by their reliance on section 27 of the Exchange Act which provides
the district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over violations arising
under the Act."0
Justice O'Connor's opinion distinguishes between the anti-
waiver provisions of the 19331 and the 19342 acts. The Court noted
that the 1933 Act's anti-waiver provision preserved many more
rights to the investor than its counterpart in the 1934 Act.78 Conse-
quently, the Court chose to conclude simply that:
§ 27 itself does not impose any duty with which persons trading
in securities must "comply." By its terms, § 29(a) only prohibits
waiver of the substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange
Act. Because section 27 does not impose any statutory duties, its
waiver does not constitute a waiver of 'compliance with any
provision' of the Exchange Act under § 29(a).74
Therefore, the McMahon's first argument failed due to the Court's
decision to apply section 27 only to those provisions which create
"substantive" duties.7 6
The Court summarily dismissed the McMahon's second argu-
ment. The Court simply quoted language from Mitsubishi Motors
68. Id. at 2337 (citing Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
69. Id. at 2338.
70. The McMahons argued that section 29(a), the anti-waiver provision of the Ex-
change Act, forbids waiver of section 27 of the Exchange Act. Section 27 provides in relevant
part: "The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of viola-
tions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and
regulations thereunder." McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338 (quoting section 27 of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1934)).
71. For the full text of section 14 (the anti-waiver provision of the 1933 Securities Act),
see supra note 45.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1934). For the full text of section 29(a) (the anti-waiver provi-
sion of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act), see infra text accompanying note 130.
73. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435).
74. Id. at 2338.
75. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. (discussing McMahon's application
only to "substantive" violations).
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Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.7' which clearly held that ar-
bitration does not strip substantive rights, but rather is merely an
alternative forum which will enforce those same rights."
The McMahon's third argument, the substance of their claim,
closely paralleled a similar argument set forth in Wilko. They ad-
vanced three reasons why arbitration weakens a plaintiff's chances to
recover. 7 The Court dismissed each of these reasons. In doing so,
the Court went as far as to admit that "the mistrust of Arbitration
that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953 is difficult to
square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since
that time."'7 9 Consequently, the Court gave no credence to any of the
McMahon's arguments. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion simply
voided Wilko's applicability to 10(b) and removed all restraints
which previously operated to curb abuse by brokers.
Therefore, it is virtually certain that the incredible breadth of
McMahon will compel restructuring of brokerage arbitration agree-
ments. Its impact will be felt most pointedly when it is seen how far
these agreements are slanted to favor brokers. One area that will
receive considerable attention by attorneys drafting these agreements
is pre-dispute venue provisions. Consequently, one must first under-
stand how the judiciary has dealt with pre-dispute venue provisions
before their application to arbitration contracts can be fully under-
stood. The leading case which develops the law in this area is
Zapata.80
2. The Breman v. Zapata
Prior to the Zapata decision in 1972, American courts disfa-
vored pre-dispute forum selection clauses."s The rationale for their
76. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
77. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2339.
78. Exactly the same arguments were entertained by the Wilko court. They are: (1)
"arbitration proceedings [are] not suited to cases requiring 'subjective findings on the purpose
and knowledge of an alleged violator;' " (2) "arbitrators must make legal determinations 'with-
out judicial instruction on the law,' and that an arbitration award 'may be made without
explanation of [the arbitrator's] reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings;' "
(3) the "[plower to vacate an award is limited," and that "interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial
review for error in interpretation." McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at
435-37).
79. Id. at 2341.
80. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
81. See Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856); Nashua River
Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 111 N.E. 678 (1916) (early examples of
this sentiment).
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disfavor was that such clauses tended to "oust the jurisdiction" of the
court or that they were simply "contrary to public policy." '82 While
many courts followed this antiquated view, a number elected to hold
contra, resulting in a split in the circuits. Hence, the judicial atmo-
sphere prior to 1972 was ripe for the United States Supreme Court
to take a definitive stance and finally determine the validity of pre-
dispute venue agreements.
Rather than directly decide whether pre-dispute venue provi-
sions are viable, the Court chose to grant certiorari to Zapata.8
Zapata was a poor selection for two reasons: (1) it involved a case in
admiralty;84 and (2) the subject venue provision was located within
an international agreement. 85
Despite these impediments, the Zapata Court took bold steps
designed to establish a new receptiveness toward pre-dispute venue
provisions. In doing so, the Court held that "such clauses are prima
facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by
the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." 86
The Court further stated that a pre-dispute venue clause should be
set aside only if its opponent could make a "strong showing" that its
enforcement "would be unreasonable and unjust, or the clause was
invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching." 8 By so holding,
82. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 9.
83. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
84. The Court noted the agreement was "clearly a reasonable effort to bring vital secur-
ity to this international transaction and to provide a neutral forum experienced and capable in
the resolution of admiralty litigation." Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Court
also stated that its new receptiveness toward pre-dispute venue provisions "is the correct doc-
trine to be followed by federal district courts sitting in admiralty." Id. at 10 (emphasis
added).
85. The Court noted that: "We are not here dealing with an agreement between two
Americans to resolve their essentially local disputes in a remote alien forum." Id. at 17. The
existence of an international agreement has often provided the Court with an opportunity to
reverse prior law without setting precedent for courts involved with strictly inter-American fact
patterns. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (wherein the Court
allowed arbitration of 10(b) disputes - as long as contained within an international agree-
ment). The Scherk Court noted that: "In the context of an international contract, however,
these advantages [choice of courts and venue] become chimerical since, as indicated above, an
opposing party may by speedy resort to a foreign country block or hinder access to the Ameri-
can court of the purchaser's choice." Id. at 518.
Thirteen years after Scherk, McMahon was definitive on this same point with regard to
strictly inter-American fact patterns.
86. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 10.
87. Id. at 15; see also Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d
341, 345 (3d Cir. 1966). The court noted that the correct test for the validity of pre-dispute
venue provisions is whether their enforcement "will put one of the parties to an unreasonable
disadvantage and thereby subvert the interests of justice." Zapata cited Central Contracting
with approval. 407 U.S. at 10 n.1l.
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the Court failed to envision the extensive impact of its decision, but
rather thought that it was "merely the other side of the proposition
recognized by this Court in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent [citation omitted], holding that in federal courts a party
may validly consent to be sued in a jurisdiction where he cannot be
found for service of process. ... 088
The Court's newfound enthusiasm for pre-dispute venue provi-
sions was based upon: (1) "ancient concepts of freedom of contract;"
(2) pragmatics of modern, international business transactions; and
(3) deference to the parties, rather than the Court's preferences. The
only reason to void such an agreement would be the existence of
fraud, undue influence or overweening bargaining power." ' Conse-
quently, traditional concepts of venue, as discussed below, were mod-
ified by the Zapata Court only to the extent that a freely negotiated
international contract, based in admiralty, could question their ex-
clusive control.
C. Traditional Forum Selection
In the absence of a valid pre-dispute venue agreement, the issue
of venue must be addressed within its statutory context. Venue is
defined as: "The particular county or geographic area in which a
court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case."' 0 In short,
88. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 10-11.
89. The Court appeared concerned that such provisions have the potential to be adhe-
sive. However, the Court noted that in the instant fact pattern, the venue provision was not in
the form of "boilerplate language that Zapata had no power to alter." Id. at 12-13 & n.14.
90. BLACK'S LAW DIrIONARY 1396 (5th ed. 1979). (emphasis added). Note that this
comment addresses the issue of venue in contractual arbitration agreements and does not ad-
dress formal judicial venue beyond analogy.
Jurisdiction has been defined as "the power and authority of a court to hear and deter-
mine a judicial proceeding." In re Estate of De Camillis, 66 Misc. 2d 882, 322 N.Y.S.2d 551,
556 (1971). The scope of jurisdiction for federal courts is governed by 28 U.S.C. section 1251
(1978). Section 1251 states:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all con-
troversies between two or more States.
(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of:
(1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public minis-
ters, consuls or vice consuls of foreign states are parties;
(2) All controversies between the United States and a State;
(3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another
State or against aliens.
Id.
It is important to note at the outset that venue is distinct from the legal concept of "juris-
diction" which operates to empower a particular court to enter judgment. In fact, the two
concepts work in conjunction to ensure that the court which ultimately adjudicates is both
empowered to do so and is convenient for the parties.
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the venue chosen by parties to a dispute will determine exactly where
their dispute will be resolved. In strictly judicial proceedings,91 this
decision is governed by either: (1) venue provisions imbedded within
a governing statute;" or (2) the general venue provisions of section
1391."8 However, in the context of arbitration, the issue of venue9'
is apparently 5 controlled by the terms of the arbitration agreement.
Therefore, to determine the correct forum for an arbitral tribunal, it
is important to appreciate the rationale behind judicial venue
statutes.
Judicial venue has its roots firmly entwined with the earliest of
English common law." Its evolution stems primarily from the fact
that the duties of early juries extended beyond the interpretation of
facts presented at trial. Indeed, early juries were usually comprised
of witnesses and were expected to engage in their own discovery.
97
Consequently, it was wise to have the jury originate from the same
locality as the claim. Therefore, venue's purpose, from even the ear-
liest of times, has been to provide for the convenience and efficacy of
litigation."
Early American venue statutes first surfaced in 1789."' These
provisions were subsequently modified in 1875 to allow an action to
91. "Judicial proceedings" are those which include no arbitration.
92. Numerous statutes dictate venue for plaintiffs seeking their enforcement. For exam-
ple, venue provisions are found within: The Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56
(1981); The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1981); patent infringement actions (28 U.S.C. §
1400(b) (1981)); The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(c) (1981); The
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1981); and both the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1981).
94. Technically, "venue" is an outright misnomer when used to designate the place of
arbitration. Strictly construed, "venue" is a term which applies only to judicial forums. For
purposes of this comment, "venue" is used in a broader sense, connoting that place where a
dispute is finally resolved by either arbitration or the judiciary.
95. McMahon is not clear as to exactly what factors will determine the place of arbitra-
tion. Since McMahon did not address the issue, it can only be presumed that the parties will
be left to decide the point for themselves.
96. Blume, Place of Trial in Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1949). Professor Blume
engages in an extensive discussion of the factors which influenced trial location from the tenth
century to the present.
97. Id. at 20. Professor Blume makes this assertion at least with regard to actions in-
volving real property. Thus, common law courts were apparently aware of the many ancillary
considerations which formed the basis of modern venue statutes. At common law, these factors
also included the nature of the particular claim. Id. at 20, 21, 25, 27.
98. Exactly whose convenience is another question. See I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 34 (6th ed. 1938), noting that the "convenience" element alluded to by the very
early cases was often that of the King's Bench. Modern venue statutes, however, provide op-
tions for the convenience and protection of the defendant. FREIDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.15 (1985).
99. Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
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be brought in any judicial district wherein the defendant was an in-
habitant or could be served. 00 In 1887, Congress again acted to re-
strict venue by permitting suit to be brought in "any other district
than that whereof [the defendant] is an inhabitant; but where thejurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between
citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the district of
the resident of either the plaintiff or the defendant."10 1
Eventually, judicial pressure forced Congress to recognize that
venue statutes were in dire need of overhaul. Congress responded by
enacting 28 U.S.C. section 1391102 in 1948. Section 1391 provides an
excellent example of how Congress (and modern courts) view the
importance and rationale behind the concept of venue.'03 The partic-
ular forum available to a litigant under section 1391 depends upon
whether the federal court has jurisdiction solely because of diversity
of citizenship;'0 4 and whether the defendant is a corporation.' 6 Con-
sequently, Congress' two primary concerns appeared to have been
why the dispute was in federal court and the relative strengths of the
parties.
100. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
101. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888,
ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433.
102. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)-1391(e). Section 1391 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial dis-
trict where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citi-
zenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside,
or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated
or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be
regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.
(d) An alien may be sued in any district.
103. However, several commentators have indicated that the differences between venue
and personal jurisdiction are either illusory or unnecessary. See Ehrenzweig, From State Juris-
diction to Interstate Venue, 50 OR. L. REV. 103, 113 (1971) (maintaining that venue is the
functional equivalent of jurisdiction); Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal
Courts - Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608 (1954) (arguing that venue and
personal jurisdiction should be one and the same . . . venue).
104. "Diversity of Citizenship" is defined as:
A phrase used with reference to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, which,
under U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, extends to cases between citizens of different
states, designating the condition existing when the party on one side of a lawsuit
is a citizen of one state, and the party on the other side is a citizen of another
state. . ..
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 429 (5th ed. 1979).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982); see also Comment, Defining "Doing Business" toDetermine Corporate Venue, 65 TEX. L. REV. 153 (1986) (addressing 1391(c)'s many short-
comings with respect to corporate defendants).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Under section 1391, if the plaintiff asserts federal jurisdiction
based solely upon diversity, he may bring suit only in the judicial
district: (1) where all defendants are located; or (2) where all plain-
tiffs are located; or (3) where the claim arose.106 Where the cause of
action is not based solely upon diversity, the plaintiff may bring suit
in the judicial district where all defendant's reside or where the
claim arose.107 Furthermore, if the defendant is a corporation, sec-
tion 1391(c) is applicable. Section 1391(c) allows the plaintiff to
bring suit in the judicial district where the corporation is: (1) incor-
porated; (2) licensed to conduct business; or (3) actually conducting
business. The plethora of venue options expressly provided by 1391
indicates that Congress went to great lengths to consider the relative
strengths and needs of particular litigants.
Congress relied upon two recurring themes to ground their con-
sideration of venue statutes. These themes are convenience1"8 and
concern for the due process rights of defendants.1 0 9 Of the two con-
cerns, a defendant's convenience receives much more discussion by
both the courts and secondary authority. However, any statute which
addresses venue, whether it be for the judiciary or arbitration, is best
understood with these two concerns in mind.
Traditionally, the convenience concern of venue statutes has
been for the defendant. 10 However, there is some authority which
recognizes that plaintiffs are also entitled to sympathy."' Concern
for the defendant's convenience has surfaced as protection against
plaintiffs who: (1) select a distant forum to secure maximum bar-
gaining power in settlement negotiations; 12 (2) forum shop for
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1982).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982).
108. Convenience is by far the most often cited rationale for venue statutes. See, e.g.,
Hutson v. Fehr Bros. Inc., 584 F.2d 833, 837 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
109. The defendant's due process rights are guaranteed in both the judicial and arbitral
context by the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.
110. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1063
(1969) (wherein it is noted that venue statutes attempt "to insure that litigation is lodged in a
convenient forum and to protect defendant against the possibility that plaintiff will select an
arbitrary place in which to bring suit." (emphasis added)).
111. See Seidelson, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Hearing Federal Cases: An Exami-
nation of the Propriety of the Limitations Imposed by Venue Restrictions, 37 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 82, 85 (1968). Professor Seidelson creates a syllogism to the effect that if: (1) plaintiffs
usually do not frivolously file suit; and (2) defendants are, by definition, the wrong-doers; then
"[ilf one must bear the inconvenience of a foreign forum . . . it should be the [wrong-doer]
defendant." Id. See also Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 380 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1967) (There can be no presumption that a
plaintiff's claims are wholly spurious.).
112. The plaintiff's bargaining power would increase by the additional cost of defending
[Vol. 28
ARBITRATION-VENUE
"high verdict" juries;118 and (3) seek to alter applicable law by se-
lecting forums with statutes supporting their claims.
In the context of arbitration, only ,the first of these concerns has
merit. This is because only the first concern involves facts which
have any possibility of arising during arbitration. The other two con-
cerns are simply inapplicable.
The first concern is meritorious because it considers the possi-
bility of a plaintiff purposely selecting a distant forum with the in-
tent of coercing a weaker defendant into settlement. Unfortunately
for brokerage house defendants, the facial appeal of this analysis fal-
ters when applied to 10(b) disputes. Its inapplicability is evinced by
the fact that 10(b) actions are almost universally instituted by
"weak" investors and defended by "strong" brokerage houses. Con-
sequently, allowing the plaintiff to chose his forum would actually
help promote the consumer protection theme espoused by the securi-
ties acts.
The second and third concerns of the aforementioned conve-
nience analysis are inapplicable in the context of arbitration. "High
verdict" juries are not a threat to arbitration's efficacy because, by its
very nature, arbitration has no jury. Furthermore, forum shop-
ping"' is equally unlikely because a fundamental tenant of arbitra-
tion is that arbitrators must follow no law. Arbitrators are free to
fashion judgments in accord with their own notions of fairness and
equity." 8
The due process concern of venue statutes is not an area of pro-
lific litigation. However, there is conflicting secondary authority on
whether the fifth amendment establishes a minimum standard of
protection for defendants below which the construction of venue stat-
ues may not fall. " 6 As a rule of thumb, it appears that if a general
in a distant forum. Seidelson, supra note 111, at 87-88.
113. A "high verdict" jury is a relative term. For example, a "high verdict" would more
probably be handed in more frequently by a jury comprised of Los Angeles residents than by a
jury comprised of more frugal Midwest farm workers.
114. It is beyond the scope of this comment to grapple with the issues presented by Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941). Furthermore, the entire Erie issue is moot when couched in terms of arbitration
analysis due to the fact that arbitrators are not bound by any body of substantive, law (unless
so stipulated by the parties), but rather their own notions of equity and justice. Wilko, 346
U.S. at 436.
115. See, e.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436 ("[a]s their [the arbitrator's] award may be made
without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings...").
116. See Seidelson, supra note 111, at 88. (wherein it is argued that venue provisions
are the result of "Congressional grace" more than constitutional mandate); c.f, Clermont,
Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L.
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arbitration venue statute grants a breadth of forum equal to that
available through the judiciary,1 7 such a statute would be upheld as
being within the purview of Congress' power." 8
In such an instance, there would be no basis for challenging the
general provision since it forges no new ground. Rather, the provi-
sion merely ensures that parties to an arbitration proceeding receive
the same venue safeguards as parties to a judicial proceeding.
Therefore, the key to effectively analyzing the validity of a specific
arbitration venue statute is to address both the factors for and
against its application and the extent by which it exceeds its judicial
counterpart.
III. ANALYSIS
The law governing venue abuse by brokers in a judicial context
is unclear. 19 Moreover, the issue of whether the courts will uphold
pre-dispute venue provisions in the arbitration context is virtually
unaddressed. The slight authority on point12 predates McMahon
and hence does not consider its likely impact. This definitive lack of
concrete authority begs a thorough analysis of the validity of broker-
age houses' pre-dispute venue provisions in the context of 10(b)
arbitration.
Two opposing considerations should be balanced when examin-
ing the legitimacy of such provisions. These are: (1) the securities
acts were designed to protect investors from unscrupulous securities
dealers; and (2) arbitration agreements rightfully enjoy a strong pre-
sumption of validity. Upon these premises, two assertions may be
made: (1) pre-dispute venue provisions which purport to force arbi-
tration at a forum convenient to the broker, and not the investor, fail
to uphold Congress's protectionist intent and therefore are "unrea-
REV. 411, 434 (1981) (Wherein it is argued that 5th amendment due process "establishes a
minimum standard or floor that the statutory venue scheme must exceed to survive a constitu-
tional challenge.").
117. This generality would very likely extend to venue obtained both through the gen-
eral venue provisions of section 1391 and the specific venue provisions imbedded within indi-
vidual enactments such as the Exchange Act of 1934.
118. The 1934 Exchange Act provides for venue in section 78aa. Section 78aa provides
in pertinent part:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or
rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or
rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business. ...
15 U.S.C. § 78aa. (emphasis added).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 81-89.
120. See Scherk, 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Zapata, 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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sonable" within the context of Zapata;2' and (2) pre-dispute venue
provisions which strip 10(b) claimants of rights explicitly guaranteed
by the Securities Exchange Act are voided by the Act's anti-waiver
provision. These two assertions are addressed in turn.
A. Contractual Venue Provisions Must be Considered in Con-
junction with Congressional Intent Behind the Securities Acts to De-
termine Their "Reasonableness."
There is no question that Congress created the Securities Acts
in reaction to the stock market crash of 1929.22 It was this tremen-
dous crash, caused in part by the hype and disingenuous conduct of
brokers, which instilled in Congress a fervent desire to protect inves-
tors. Consequently, a provision which strips an investor of the secur-
ities acts' protection frustrates Congress' intent. It is asserted that
such a provision is thus "unreasonable," and falls within the excep-
tion to Zapata.1 8 To support this contention, the question of "un-
reasonableness," as a caveat of Zapata, must be explored. One case
which has done exactly this is Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Man-
nesmann-Bohler.2 4
Copperweld is a Third Circuit Court of Appeals case handed
down in 1978, six years after Zapata. The facts of Copperweld in-
volve a sales contract for the purchase of steel casters. The parties
were Copperweld Steel Company of Ohio (plaintiff) and Demag-
Mannesmann-Bohler of Germany (defendant). A purchase agree-
ment between the parties provided that any dispute arising from the
terms of their agreement would be settled by a German court. The
third circuit found the pre-dispute venue provision unreasonable and
unenforceable because: (1) the dispute arose in America; (2) all evi-
dence was in America; and (3) all the witnesses were in America.25
The specific test of "reasonableness" laid out by Copperweld
121. See infra text accompanying note 130 for the language of section 29, the Securities
Exchange Acts' anti-waiver provision. 28 U.S.C. § 77cc(a) & (b).
122. See supra note 37-42 and accompanying text; see also Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435
(noting "it is clear that the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under
which buyers labor.").
123. 407 U.S. at 10 ("Such clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances.").
See McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2339 (Justice O'Connor indicates that the anti-waiver provision
of the Exchange Act is not contingent upon a showing of voluntariness by the investor, but
rather whether the brokerage agreement "weaken[s] their ability to recover under the [Ex-
change] Act." (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432)).
124. 578 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1978).
125. Id. at 964-66.
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was whether enforcement of the venue provision "will put one of the
parties to an unreasonable disadvantage and thereby subvert the in-
terests of justice."' 26 To make this determination, the court in Cop-
perweld balanced each parties benefit and detriment in the event the
venue provision was upheld. 2 The court's analysis led it to believe
that the rights of Copperweld would be impinged since they "might
well have been prevented from receiving a 'fair and complete
hearing .... ' "128
Copperweld is an excellent example of how an informed court
will look beyond Zapata's blind enthusiasm to consider the facts that
ground a particular case. To the extent that the facts of a 10(b) arbi-
tration proceeding are analogous to the facts of Copperweld, there is
reason to believe that pre-dispute arbitral venue provisions are "un-
reasonable" and therefore void. The facts of Copperweld can be read
to virtually parallel the facts of a 10(b) claimant.
The facts which attend a 10(b) cause of action are clear only
when considered in light of the dilemma of a typical 10(b) claimant.
Such an investor is usually the victim of "churning"' 29 by his broker.
One of the characteristics which tip an investor to broker churning is
a disproportionately high number of expensive trades. An additional
component of churning which spurs an investor to seek redress is a
dramatic reduction in the value of his portfolio. In either instance, it
is fair to assume that many investors who are seeking 10(b) redress
will be pursuing their claims while amidst severe financial chaos or
possibly, bankruptcy.
Unfortunately, it is at precisely this tumultuous juncture in an
investor's career that the broker's pre-dispute venue provision will be
given effect. It is at this time that the investor will be forced to argue
his case not before a sympathetic jury, nor before a convenient local
arbitrator, but rather in a distant and prohibitively expensive arbi-
tral forum. Consequently, a pre-dispute venue provision carries with
it more than the mere possibility of injustice. Pre-dispute venue
agreements carry with them an extreme likelihood that they will op-
erate against the best interests of an investor. Therefore, it is against
public policy - and the manifest intent of the securities acts - to en-
126. Id. at 966; see Central Contracting, 367 F.2d at 345 & n.18.
127. 578 F.2d at 965.
128. Id. at 966 (citing Copperweld, 347 F. Supp. at 54).
129. Churning is defined as: "when a broker, exercising control over the volume and
frequency of trades, abuses his customer's confidence for personal gain by initiating transac-
tions that are excessive in view of the character of account and the customer's objectives as
expressed to the broker." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 220 (5th ed. 1979).
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force pre-dispute venue agreements which operate to the detriment of
the investor.
B. Pre-dispute Venue Agreements Which Dictate the Locus of Ar-
bitration are Void Due to the 1934 Exchange Act's Anti-waiver
Provision.
Like section 14 of the 1933 Act, section 29(a) of the 1934 Act
voids any contractual provision which purports to waive any right
granted by the Act. Section 29(a) [the anti-waiver provision] states:
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule
or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required
thereby shall be void."1 ' Therefore, to understand section 29(a)'s
effect upon section 27, one must first determine if the Exchange
Act's grant of venue amounts to a provision within the meaning of
section 29(a) and then consider whether a pre-dispute venue agree-
ment amounts to a waiver thereto. These considerations are ad-
dressed in turn.
To determine if section 27 is a "provision" worthy of protection
by section 29(a), it is important to ascertain the impact of section 27
upon a 10(b) cause of action. Section 27 dictates three important
elements of a 10(b) claim: (1) jurisdiction;181 (2) venue; and (3) ser-
vice of process. While jurisdiction and service of process are beyond
the scope of this comment, section 27's treatment of venue is cer-
tainly on point.
Section 27's venue element provides that a 10(b) claimant may
bring suit where: (1) the violation occurred; (2) the defendant is
found; (3) the defendant is an inhabitant; or (4) the defendant trans-
acts business. Absent section 27, a. 10(b) plaintiff would be subject to
the general venue provisions of section 1391(c)." 2 Section 1391(c)
would provide the plaintiff with three choices of venue. These
choices are: (1) where the broker is incorporated; (2) where the bro-
ker is licensed to do business; or (3) where the broker is actually
130. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1934).
131. McMahon directly addressed the question of section 27's jurisdictional language. It
held that section 27's grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts was not "substantive" and
therefore may be replaced by arbitration. The Court's rationale was that arbitration was not
an offensive forum, but merely an alternative forum for the enforcement of the Exchange Act's
remedies. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2339-41.
132. This assertion assumes that the defendant is a corporation. If the broker is named
individually, respondeat superior would probably result in the corporate brokerage house's
ultimate liability in any event.
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doing business. Consequently, section 27 grants 10(b) plaintiffs
much wider venue selection than is available in its absence. It ap-
pears, therefore, that when a specific provision of the consumer ori-
ented Exchange Act significantly expands a claimant's pre-existing
rights, it is exactly the type of provision which should be protected
by section 29(a).
Having determined that section 27 grants rights worthy of pro-
tection, the issue becomes: what constitutes a "waiver" of these
rights. A "waiver" is defined as "an intentional and voluntary giving
up, relinquishment, or surrender of some known right." '33 Specifi-
cally, a 10(b) claimant would have given an executory waiver. An
executory waiver is "one that affects a still unperformed duty of a
contracting party, as in the excuse by A of performance by B of
something that A has a right to exact."" 4 Therefore, to claim that a
pre-dispute arbitral venue provision amounts to a waiver, a 10(b)
claimant must prove: (1) that he knowingly relinquished venue rights
provided by section 27; and (2) that such rights were of such a na-
ture that he had the right to exact or rely upon them.
The first prong, that of knowledge, would be difficult for most
investors to prove because waiver provisions are typically buried
within pages of fine-print brokerage agreements.13 However, the re-
quirement that a claimant know what he is relinquishing exists for
the benefit of the investor and certainly not for the broker. Conse-
quently, if the investor was unaware of the pre-dispute venue provi-
sion at its execution, a strong argument could be made that the pro-
vision is adhesionary. In such a case, the entire issue of whether
section 27 may be waived would be moot as the provision would be
struck from the contract.1 6
133. S. GIFIS, supra note 43, at 511-12.
134. S. GIFIS, supra note 43, at 512.
135. It has been held that buyers of securities cannot contract to waive compliance with
securities laws, regardless of whether the waiver was conscious or inadvertent. See Special
Transp. Serv., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Minn. 1971).
136. A full development of the question of adhesion is beyond the scope of this comment.
However, the issue is aptly discussed in J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON, JR. & P. SZANTON, Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA: PROCESS IN EVOLUTION 47 (1984) (Wherein the authors
note that adhesionary contracts are often used in the real property and service industry.). Addi-
tionally, such contracts may be "unconscionable" within the meaning of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. See 1 R. ALDERMAN, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 60-67 (1983); see also U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978): "If the court as a matter of law finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract with-
out the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause
at to avoid an unconscionable result." Id.
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The second prong would be much easier for 10(b) claimants to
address. There is simply no question that, in the absence of a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement, a 10(b) claimant has a right to rely
upon section 27's venue provisions. There is no authority raising the
slightest hint that section 27 may grant rights to only a particular
class of 10(b) claimants. Objectively, therefore, it is evident that sec-
tion 29(a) operates to void pre-dispute venue agreements.
While objective analysis appears to support section 29(a)'s ap-
plication to pre-dispute venue agreements, an additional considera-
tion was interjected by the McMahon Court. This consideration
deals with the Court's curious posture with regard to section 29(a)
and its effect upon substantive rights granted by the Exchange Act.
McMahon addresses the issue of waiver by deciding that section
29(a) only prohibits the waiver of "substantive obligations imposed
by the Act.' 1 7 Furthermore, section 27, was found "not [to] impose
any statutory duties,"' 8 and was therefore subject to waiver. Conse-
quently, to the extent that section 27 addresses the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts, McMahon definitively held that it may be
validly waived without concern for the impact of section 29(a).
However, as noted above, section 27 addresses more than mere
jurisdiction. Section 27 also addresses the question of venue. It is
through this crucial distinction, and its application in a strictly arbi-
tral context that McMahon may be distinguished from the case at
bar, and Wilko's rationale becomes more compelling.
Before distinguishing McMahon, it is important to consider the
breadth of its impact and its relation to Wilko. McMahon did not
completely overrule Wilko. Rather, McMahon only limited Wilko to
its facts - 12(2) disputes arising under the 1933 Securities Act. In
fact, McMahon interpreted Wilko's impact upon 12(2) as viable, and
best understood "in the context of the Court's ensuing discussion ex-
plaining why arbitration was inadequate as a means of enforcing
'the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the buyer.' ""9
Furthermore, the Court noted that: "Scherk supports our under-
standing that Wilko must be read as barring waiver of a judicial
forum only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive
rights at issue. '"14"
137. 107 S. Ct. at 2338. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
138. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338. Note that the facts before the court, which gave rise
to this assertion, addressed only the jurisdictional element of section 27 and not its venue
element.
139. Id. (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435).
140. Id. at 2339 (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 506).
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Therefore, there are two compelling reasons to believe that Mc-
Mahon's holding with regard to section 27 is inapplicable in the con-
text of arbitration: (1) McMahon dealt solely with the jurisdictional
language of section 27; and (2) pre-dispute venue provisions are suf-
ficiently unique - as were the facts of Wilko and its application to
section 12(2) - to compel an independent evaluation of whether
their enforcement would strip an investor of a "provision of the Se-
curities [Exchange] Act, advantageous to the buyer." 14 Considera-
tion of these two factors, and the fact that arbitration's location can
be far more damaging than its mere use, compels a conclusion ap-
positive to that of McMahon. Consequently, action must be taken to
address the issue of pre-dispute arbitration agreements which pur-
port to lay venue where it is convenient to the broker and not the
investor.
IV. PROPOSAL: ENSURE SECTION 27 FORUM SELECTION
PRIVILEGES TO 10(b) ARBITRATION CLAIMANTS
Notwithstanding the above analysis, an equally plausible argu-
ment can be made that McMahon's rationale with regard to jurisdic-
tion may be extended to cover venue. Consequently, additional safe-
guards are necessary to preserve the venue provisions of section 27.
One such safeguard is to specifically provide all 10(b) arbitration
claimants with the benefits of section 27 venue. Section 10(b) claim-
ants may benefit from section 27 by virtue of either an amendment to
the Federal Arbitration Act 14 2 or amendment to the 1934 Exchange
Act. 143
Such an amendment must closely parallel the language and
function of section 27 with one crucial exception. The amendment
must stand on its own. It should be recognized as an independent
manifestation of congressional intent. By carefully providing such
status, there will be no question that compliance is mandatory.
144
This confidence is legitimate because: (1) traditional rules of statu-
tory construction will apply to ensure adherence to controlling stat-
141. Id. at 2338 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435).
142. The appropriate amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act would be to create 9
U.S.C. § 15.
143. The appropriate amendment to the Exchange Act would be to create 15 U.S.C. §
78aa(b). Note that the existing section 78aa addresses the venue of 10(b) suits filed in court.
The existing text would be designated subsection (a) to accommodate subsection (b).
144. While it is true that arbitrators need not comply with laws governing the dispute
before them unless directed to do so in the arbitration agreement, in the case at bar the pro-
posed amendment will take effect before the dispute is submitted to arbitration. Consequently,
there is no possibility of an arbitrator ignoring the proposed amendment's mandate.
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utes prior to submitting the dispute to arbitration; and (2) section
29(a) will remove any doubt that both the broker and investor must
comply with the proposed amendment.
Therefore, to ensure 10(b) arbitration claimants receive venue
protection equal to their 10(b) judicial counterparts, the following
statute should be adopted:
LOCATION OF 10(b) ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
Arbitration proceedings, based upon an alleged violation of section
10(b), shall be instituted:
1. Where the defendant is found;
2. Where the defendant is an inhabitant;
3. Where the defendant transacts business;
at the discretion of the party initiating arbitration. In no instance
shall forum selection be made prior to filing for arbitration.
Enactment of this statute would prove beneficial to investors in
three crucial ways. First, it would ensure that the consumer protec-
tion attitude of the Exchange Act was not inadvertently muted by the
McMahon decision. Second, it would remove any doubt as to
whether brokers may fashion pre-dispute arbitration agreements to
suit only the broker's needs. Third, it would be preserved by section
29(a) (the anti-waiver provision) and withstand challenge on due
process grounds.'4 5 Most importantly, however, the proposed statute
would further the single most important reason for venue statutes:
convenience."
V. CONCLUSION
The 1987 United States Supreme Court case of McMahon v.
Shearson /American Express, Inc. held that brokerage houses may
include arbitration provisions within client agreements. Unfortu-
nately, the McMahon Court simply condoned section 10(b) arbitra-
tion without considering the possible repercussions of its en mass
145. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. (As the proposed statute merely
ensures arbitral claimants the same venue opportunities as their judicial counterparts, there
would be no basis for a due process challenge.).
146. Convenience of arbitration claimants would also be furthered to the extent that the
proposed statute avoids litigation. The proposed statue clearly defines the venue rights of 10(b)
arbitration claimants in light of McMahon, obviating the need for further judicial
determination.
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implementation. One such repercussion, which may be exploited by
brokers, is the use of one-sided venue provisions.
A pre-dispute venue provision purporting to lay venue in a dis-
tant forum is particularly likely to frustrate a 10(b) claimant because
such a claimant is typically insolvent. By virtue of the fact that an
investor files a 10(b) claim, one may presume that he has been the
victim of conduct by his broker which resulted in substantial finan-
cial losses. It would be completely inequitable, therefore, to force
such an aggrieved claimant to defend his claim at a forum chosen to
suit the broker's best interests. Consequently, the consumer protec-
tion rationale of the securities acts is completely circumvented by giv-
ing brokers a carte blanc mandate to fashion arbitration agreements
to further only their interests.
A possible solution to abusive venue provisions is to amend ei-
ther the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or the Federal Arbitration
Act. This amendment should provide an arbitration claimant with
the identical choice of forums as section 27 of the Exchange Act. If
such an amendment were carefully drafted to exhibit independent
Congressional support, its intent would be protected by both tradi-
tional statutory interpretation and the anti-waiver provision of the
Exchange Act. Hence, McMahon's worthy support for arbitration
would not be tainted by brokers who may seize it as an opportunity
to circumvent Congress' most fundamental intent behind the securi-
ties acts: consumer protection.
Ward M. Merdes
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